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Abstract
This paper proposes a dialogue game in which coherent
conversational sequences at the speech act level are descri-
bed of agents that become aware they have an irresolva-
ble disagreement and settle the dispute by agreeing to dis-
agree. A disagreement is irresolvable from an agent’s per-
spective if both agents are aware that they both ran out of
options to resolve the situation. A dialogue game is formu-
lated in which agents can offer information that may result
in non-reconcilable, mutually inconsistent belief states. An
agent’s cognitive state consists of mental constructs, and
given on these constructs, epistemic operators are deﬁned
which are used to deﬁne dialogue rules and a cognitive ru-
le that allow an agent to agree to disagree.
1. A Dialogue Game to Offer Information
In general conversations, participating agents may have
autonomy over their cognitive states, but they may also desi-
re to change those of others. These agents may ﬁnd them-
selves stuck in discussions about non-reconcilable beliefs.
In Beun [2] and Lebbink et al. [4] speech acts between
agents are described and rules are identiﬁed that form a dia-
logue game that agents needs to play to fulﬁl their desires. A
dialogue game consists of a set of dialogue rules that deﬁne
which communicative acts an agent may utter given its cur-
rent cognitive state. In addition, a dialogue game has a set
of update rules that deﬁne the contents of the agent’s cog-
nitive state after a communicative act is uttered. In the cur-
rent game we assume that information can only accumula-
te in the participants’ cognitive states and cannot be retrac-
ted. In this information-monotonic approach additions may
introduce inconsistent beliefs.
To deﬁne the agent’s cognitive state allowing inconsis-
tent beliefs we need a multi-valued logic (MVL). In MVL
new truth-values are introduced to represent epistemic at-
titudes like unknown or inconsistent information states. In
Lebbink et al. [4], an MVL is introduced based on truth-
values from a bilattice structure. This allows us to create
theories that are capable of being an agent’s belief or igno-
rance state. A bilattice is an algebraic structure formalizing
an intuitive space of generalized truth-values with two lat-
tice orderings [3]. We use a bilattice for a four-valued logic
by [1] in which truth-values t and f represent true and fal-
se, and u and i represent a complete lack of information (un-
known) and the inconsistent information state.
Theories of MVL logics are sets of propositions with cer-
tain properties. Three different theories are distinguished:
normal theories which represent the agent’s desires; com-
plete theories representing the agent’s belief state; and dual
theories representing the agent’s ignorance state. If an agent
believes a that term p has at least truth-value t, i.e. p:t, and
it also concludes to believe p : f, it also believes p : i sta-
ting that the agent has an inconsistent belief state with re-
gard to p.
The agent’s cognitive state consists of a ﬁnite number of
mental constructs which are theories of MVL. We will not
present a formal deﬁnition of the different epistemic ope-
rators like belief, desire and ignorance that agents have re-
garding themselves and other agents; it sufﬁces to say that
the agent has private mental constructs and it keeps track of
mental constructs of others in manifested mental constructs.
Cognitive processes are described with rules that state
when an agent is allowed to add a proposition to its be-
lief state. These rules apply when their criteria hold in the
agent’s cognitive state. Three cognitive capabilities or pro-
cesses are distinguished: deciding to believe propositions,
deducing consequences of newly accepted beliefs, and de-
ducing that one has an irresolvable disagreement with ano-
ther agent. We assume that agents are very credulous: they
accept to believe a proposition if they are aware that ano-
ther agent believes the proposition and it is consistent with
their current belief state on a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve basis.
If we are to specify the semantics of communicative acts,
we are to give the criteria for uttering the acts, and the con-
sequences these acts have on the agent’s cognitive state. A
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dialogue rule for a speech act λ states that if all criteria of
λ hold according to an agent’s cognitive state, then λ may
be uttered. Update rules deﬁne the contents of an agent’s
cognitive state after a communicative act is uttered. An up-
date rule for a speech act λ states that if λ is directed at an
agent, then the post-conditions of λ hold for that agent. Dia-
logue and update rules deﬁne the space of all possible dia-
logues in the dialogue game.
An agent’s motivation to utter a question can be descri-
bed when it is to balance its belief and desire state [2]. In
a similar fashion the motivation to offer information regar-
ding some proposition p :θ is described as the situation in
which an agent x has the desire that y is to believe p:θ, and
x is not aware that y already believes p:θ. The full set of cri-
teria and post conditions of offers and answers to offers are
not presented due to space limitations here.
2. To Agree to Disagree
If two agents are unable to agree on a belief, a persua-
sion dialogue, similar to the dialogue game to offer infor-
mation, may resolve the disagreement by adding informa-
tion to the agents’ belief states [5]. If all methods to per-
suade are exhausted, the agents can conclude that they dis-
agree on a speciﬁc proposition and that they both agree on
this.
An agent x is aware that it disagrees with agent y about
the truth-value of proposition p iff x believes p:θ1 and x be-
lieves that y believes p:θ2, and the truth-values are in dis-
agreement, which in a four-valued logic can occur in on-
ly one possibility: t disagrees with f. A second-order dis-
agreement awareness exists when an agent x is aware that
another agent y believes a proposition p :θ1 and x is awa-
re that y is aware that x believes proposition p:θ2 and the
truth-values are in disagreement.
The cognitive rule that states when an agent may believe
that it has an irresolvable disagreement can now be captu-
red in a reasoning rule. An agent x may add to its belief sta-
te an agreement to disagree with agent y about term p (we
call agent x ‘I’ and agent y ‘you’):
1. I am aware that I have a disagreement with you about
term p.
2. I am aware that you are also aware of the disagree-
ment.
3. There is no set of propositions that I believe and that
I have not offered to you that could have resolved the
disagreement if you had accepted to believe them. In
this situation, I have no methods (sets of propositions)
left to persuade you.
4. I am aware that there is no set of propositions that you
believe and that you have not offered to me before that
could have resolved the disagreement if I had accepted
to believe them. In this situation, I think that you ha-
ve no methods (sets of propositions) left to resolve the
situation.
If these four criteria hold then the agent is allowed to be-
lieve that it is stuck in an irresolvable disagreement. The
dialogue game takes care of communicating this informati-
on to agent y and y reaching the actual agreement, making
the agreement to disagree common belief.
3. Conclusions
What is lacking in Beun [2] and Lebbink et al. [4] is the
possibility for agents to recognize an irresolvable disagree-
ments and, based on this recognition, to offer an agreement
to disagree. In this paper we have given the sketch of a for-
mal semantics for a dialogue game that enables agents to
offer information, and we have given the criteria to become
aware of an irresolvable disagreement, which can be com-
municated with the dialogue game, making the disagree-
ment common belief. This common belief may motivate
dialogues to weaken arguments in order to retract propo-
sitions that would resolve the disagreement, or to redeﬁne
the meaning of propositions that resulted in the disagree-
ment.
Dialogues can be generated from the dialogue and upda-
te rules, providing the possibility to analyse dialogue games
on useful properties like termination, whether the unbalan-
ced desire/belief states are resolved in the agent’s cognitive
state if the dialogue has ended, or whether the dialogue ends
in uniqueness of cognitive states (conﬂuence). The presen-
ted game is not conﬂuent because an agent accepts to belie-
ve a proposition if it is consistent with its current belief sta-
te. This makes the timing of communicative acts of crucial
importance, resulting in the possibility of different end sta-
tes.
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